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THE ILLINOIS PRUDENT MAN INVESTMENT STATUTE.
William H. Dillon*
WT!eE ILLINoIs legislature, in 1945, amended Section 1 of an Act
entitled "An Act concerning powers of trustees,"' and
thereby adopted the Prudent Man Investment Rule for trustees.
This amendatory Act, approved by the Governor on May 17, 1945,
and effective July 1, 1945, reads as follows:
§ 1. In acquiring, investing, reinvesting, exchanging, re-
taining, selling and managing property for any trust here-
tofore or hereafter created, the trustee thereof shall exercise
the judgment and care under the circumstances then pre-
vailing, which men of prudence, discretion and intelligence
exercise in the management of their own affairs, not in re-
gard to speculation but in regard to the permanent disposi-
tion of their funds, considering the probable income as well
as the probable safety of their capital. Within the limita-
tions of the foregoing standard, the trustee is authorized to
acquire and retain every kind of property real, personal or
mixed, and every kind of investment, including specifically
but without in any way limiting the generality of the fore-
* Member, Illinois Bar; A.B., DePaul University, LI.B., Loyola University; Vice-
Chairman, American Bar Association Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust
Law.
I Laws 1905, p. 1; Il1. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 148, § 32.
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going, bonds, debentures and other corporate obligations,
stocks, preferred or common, and real estate mortgages,
which men of prudence, discretion and intelligence acquire
or retain for their own account, and within the limitations
of the foregoing standard, the trustee is authorized to retain
property properly acquired, without limitation as to time
and without regard to its suitability for original purchase.
§ la. Nothing contained in the foregoing section shall
be construed as authorizing or requiring any departure
from, or variation of, the express terms or limitations set
forth in any will, agreement, court order or other instru-
ment creating or defining the trustee's duties and powers,
but the terms "legal investment" or "authorized invest-
ment" or words of similar import, as used in any such in-
strument, shall be taken to mean any investment which is
permitted by the terms of Section 1 hereof.
§ lb. Nothing contained in Section la of this Act shall
be construed as restricting the power of a court of com-
petent jurisdiction to permit a trustee to deviate from the
terms of any will, agreement, or other instrument relating
to the acquisition, investment, reinvestment, exchange, re-.
tention, sale or management of trust property.
§ lc. The word "trust," as used in the foregoing sec-
tions, means a trust created by will, deed, agreement, declara-
tion, written instrument, or in any lawful manner. The
word "trustee" means the trustee, or any successor trus-
tee, of any such trust, whether appointed by the instrument
creating the trust, by order of court, or otherwise.2
The new Act stems from the so-called Massachusetts Invest-
ment Rule for Trustees enunciated in 1830 in the famed case of
Harvard College v. Amnory.3 Predicated upon the concept that
"Do what you will, the capital is at hazard," the statement of
the rule made by the court therein was that:
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that
2 Laws 1945, pp. 1779-80: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 148, § 32 et seq.
326 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
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he shall conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound
discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence, discretion
and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to
speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of
their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the
probable safety of the capital to be invested.
4
This rule has been uninterruptedly followed by the Massachu-
setts courts during the ensuing one hundred and fifteen years.6
The current Illinois statute, therefore, commences with a back-
ground of more than a century of judicial construction. The
new legislation is not unique, however, for in addition to Illinois,
the Prudent Man Rule is followed by statute in eight states," and
has been made the rule by judicial decision in seven others.7
There is naturally an abundance of judicial decision constru-
ing and applying the Prudent Man Rule in Massachusetts, but for
reasons subsequently set forth it is not deemed necessary to re-
4 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 at 461.
See, for example, Brown v. French, 125 Mass. 410 (1878) ; Hunt v. Appellant,
141 Mass. 515, 6 N. E. 554 (1886): Dickinson. Appellant. 152 Mass. 184, 25 N. E.
99 (1890); Kimball v. Whitney, 233 Mass. 321, 123 N. E. 666 (1919); Exchange
Trust Co. v. Doudera. 270 Mass. 227, 170 N. E. 73 (1930) ; Sprgfld. Safe Dep. & T.
Co. v. First Unitar. Soc., 293 Mass. 480, 200 N. E. 541 (1936).
6 The following jurisdictions, as well as Illinois, have enacted a model statute
prepared by a committee of the American Bankers Association, Trust Division:
California. Statutes, 1943, Ch. 811; Delaware, Laws 1943, Ch. 171, § 4401; Maine,
Laws 1945, Ch. 80, § 17-A et seq.; Minnesota, Laws 1943, Ch. 635; Texas, Gen.
Laws 1945, Ch. 77, § 46. Other jurisdictions have achieved similar results by
various forms of statutory enactments: Connecticut, Gen. Stat. 1937, § 1289e;
Michigan, Pub. Acts 1937, No. 177; New Hampshire, Rev. Laws 1942, p. 1551, § 17.
It should be noted that the Minnesota and Michigan statutes refer to a "prudent
trustee" standard rather than a "prudent man" standard.
7 MARYLAND: Gray v. Lynch, 8 Gill 403 (1849) ; Carey v. Safe Dep. & Tr. Co.,
168 Md. 501, 178 A. 242 (1935); Johnson v. Johnson, 168 Md. 568, 179 A. 831
(1135). MASSACHUSETTS: see cases cited in note 5, ante. MissouRi: Rand v.
McKittrick, 346 Mo. 466, 142 S. W. (2d) 29 (1940) ; St. Louis Union Trust Co. v.
Toberman, 235 Mo. App. 559, 140 S. W. (2d) 68 (1940). NoRTH CAEOLINA: Sheets
v. J. G. Flynt Tobacco Co., 195 N. C. 149, 141 S. E. 355 (1928), is said to be
generally relied upon by fiduciaries in that state as establishing the Prudent Man
Rule although North Carolina does have a legal list, N. Car. Gen. Stat. 1943,
§ 36--1: see also Cheshire v. First Presbyterian Church, 225 N. C. 165, 33 S. E.
(2d) 866 (1945). RHODE ISLAND: Peckham v. Newton, 15 R. I. 321, 4 A. 758
(1886) ; Grinnell v. Baker, 17 R. I. 41, 20 A. 8 and 23 A. 911 (1892) ; see also
R. I. Gen. Laws 1938, Ch. 486. TENNESSEE: Gibson Co. v. Fourth & First Nat.
Bank. 20 Tenn. App. 168, 96 S. W. (2d) 184 (1936) ; Young v. Phillips, 170 Tenn.
169, 93 S. W. (2d) 634 (1936) ; Falls v. Carruthers, 20 Tenn. App. 681, 103 S. W.
(2d) 605 (1936) ; Steinberg v. Cox, 24 Tenn. App. 340, 144 S. W. (2d) 12 (1939).
VEIMONT: Scoville v. Brock, 81 Vt. 405, 70 A. 1014 (1908) ; McCloskey v. Gleason,
56 Vt. 264 (1883).
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view these cases.8 On the other hand, in order to determine the
extent of change effected in the Illinois law by the new Act, it is
important to examine its legislative and judicial antecedents.
With this end in view, a review of the Illinois decisions and pre-
ceding statutory enactments seems proper.
I. EARLY ILLINOIS CASES
The earliest expression in Illinois concerning the investments
which a trustee-could properly make, in the absence of directions
in the trust instrument, is to be found in Sholty v. Sholty,9 where
the court said:
It is the duty of a trustee holding funds in trust, with no
express or implied directions in the instrument creating the
trust as to the management of the fund, to invest the same in
good and safe securities ... There can be question that it was
the clear duty of the appellant [trustee], . . . upon receiving
the trust fund, to loan the same on sufficient securities, at
lawful interest, exercising the same care and diligence as in
the transaction of like business -for himself .... lO
The court did not specify what type of securities were "good and
safe," but it is significant to note that they were to be interest-
bearing. It also injected a standard of prudence into its decision
by requiring a trustee to exercise "the same care and diligence as
in the transaction of like business for himself."
Similar language was used by the court, in Butler v. Butler,"
when it disapproved a trustee's purchase of lands and the opening
of a coal mine thereon. Under the terms of the will there con-
cerned, a specified sum was bequeathed to certain trustees, who
were to "keep the same invested, in their discretion." Constru-
ing this provision, the court said that "it was the intention of the
testator that the trustees should invest said money and keep it
8 See note 5, ante, and also note 88, post.
9 140 Ill. 81, 29 N. E. 1041 (1892).
10 140 Ill. 81 at 87, 29 N. E. 1041 at 1043.
11 164 Ill. 171, 45 N. E. 426 (1896).
PRUDENT MAN INVESTMENT STATUTE
invested, as a fund, in interest-bearing securities that were readily
convertible into money," and when the trustees "used the money
in purchasing lands and in opening a coal mine thereon, and in
mining operations, such acts were a perversion of the fund." The
concept of ready convertibility introduced by the court does not
aid in defining the type of "interest-bearing securities" which it
had in mind.
In White v. Sherman,12 the court held a trustee's estate liable
to the beneficiaries for losses to the trust fund incurred by depre-
ciation in the value of railroad stocks purchased by the trustee.
The trustee had purchased the stocks in his own individual name
and the stock certificates were so issued. In addition, he had been
speculating heavily in the same stock and had personally profited
by collecting commissions on insurance premiums paid by him,
concealing these facts from the beneficiaries. The court recog-
nized that these actions constituted breaches of trust sufficient to
warrant surcharges against the trustee. Nevertheless, the opinion
included the following statement:
Where there are no express directions in the instrument creat-
ing the trust, and no statutory provisions, in relation to the
character of the securities in which trust funds may be in-
vested, a trustee cannot invest such funds in stocks, bonds
or other securities of private business corporations. In Eng-
land, trustees are required to invest trust funds in real estate
securities, or in the public securities of the British govern-
ment. In this country the same requirement, in regard to
making investments in real estate securities or government
securities, is generally recognized by the courts. At any rate,
"all speculative risks are forbidden." . . . The rule is, that,
in the investment of trust funds, the trustee must not only
act in good faith and use sound discretion and reasonable
vigilance, but, where he is appointed by a court. . . he must
select such securities as the court will approve.13
12 168 I1. 589, 48 N. E. 128 (1897).
In 168 Ill. 589 at 602, 48 N. E. 128 at 131.
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These statements have been criticized as dicta, 4 but they cannot
be overlooked for they serve to indicate the attitude of the court,
in 1899, on the subject of trust investments.
In a later case, that of Penn v. Fogler,15 the court held that
a trustee de son tort had no power to invest trust funds in a
banking partnership, and it permitted the complainants to follow
the assets involved into the hands of the receiver of the bankrupt
partnership. When so doing, the court said:
A trustee will not be protected from loss in investing trust
funds, unless he invests in government or real estate securi-
ties, or other securities approved by the court, to which he is
accountable . . . A trustee should not invest the money of
others in his care in the stock or shares of any private cor-
poration, nor has he any right to employ trust funds in a
private business, and thereby subject them to the fluctuations
of trade, even though such investment is approved of by
his own judgment, and is made with honest intent. It is the
duty of a trustee to make investments of trust funds in
real estate securities or government securities, whether of
the national or State government, or, if he is acting under
the direction of a court, to select such securities as the court
approves of. 16
These cases illustrate the state of the Illinois law on the sub-
ject prior to the enactment of the 1905 statute. The two earlier
cases authorized investments in interest-bearing obligations suffi-
ciently secured; the two later cases seem to add restrictions by
specifying that such interest-bearing obligations should take the
form of real-estate securities or government securities. Three of
the four cases enunciated a rule of prudence in conjunction with
the imposition of a limitation on investments. The only safe con-
clusion which a trustee could have drawn from these decisions,
14 See Nylund, "Investments by Trustees," 20 CHcAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 331
(1942), particularly p. 341.
-5 182 Ill. 76, 55 N. E. 192 (1899).
16 182 Il1. 70 at 103, 55 N. E. 192 at 199.
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therefore, was to invest trust funds in government or real-estate
securities. However, it is significant to note that in no one of
these cases was the trustee given special direction concerning
investments by the trust instrument, and in each of these cases it
was either specifically stated or clearly implied that trustees might
be authorized to invest trust funds in such manner as might be
directed in the instrument creating the trust.17 If the trust instru-
ment had granted the trustee broad discretionary power in
making investments, there was nothing in these early cases to
indicate that the trustee would have been governed other than by
the rule of prudence.
II. THE ACT OF 1905
When the legislature passed the 1905 Act' it resolved the con-
fusion inherent in the judicial decisions to that time by specifying,
with particularity, the investments which a trustee might make
when not otherwise controlled by the trust instrument. As origi-
nally enacted, the statute read:
That investments of trust funds by trustees may, when not
otherwise provided by the will, deed, decree, gift, grant or
other instrument creating or fixing the respective trust, be in
the bonds of the United States or of any of the states of the
United States, or in first mortgages upon real estate in any
state or in the bonds of any county, city or municipality in
any state, or in the first mortgage bonds of any corporation
of any state upon which no default in payment of interest
shall have occurred, for a period of five years, but no trustee
shall be authorized by this act to invest trust funds in any
bonds in which cautious and intelligent persons do not invest
their own money and any trustee may continue to hold any
investment received by him under the trust or any increase
thereof. 19
17 This interpretation was actually enunciated In Merchants Loan & Trust Co.
v. Northern Trust Co., 250 Ill. 86 at 92, 95 N. E. 59 at 61 (1911).
is Laws 1905, p. 1.
19 Laws 1905, p. 1; I1. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 148, § 32.
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The act removed any doubt as to the propriety of investment in
corporate bonds, although the legislature did engraft two limita-
tions: (1) that no default in interest shall have occurred for a
period of five years; and (2)' that no funds should be invested in
bonds in which cautious and intelligent persons would not invest
their own money. The second of these limitations was not new
for, as has already been seen, the Illinois Supreme Court had
voiced a similar rule of prudence.
The 1905 Act, therefore, in substance was a reiteration of
doctrines previously enunciated by the courts and merely codified
these decisions. The Act permitted what the court had sanctioned,
viz: investment in government bonds and real estate securities.
During the period from 1905 to 1945, various amendments added
other securities to the list enumerated in the original statute, 20
but these amendments did not alter the two basic classifications
although they did enlarge the classifications in the restricted sense
that they elaborated upon the specific types of securities originally
designated by the legislature. Even though amended from time to
time, the 1905 Act retained throughout the requirement of pru-
dence which appeared in the first enactment, to-wit: "no trustee
shall be authorized by this Act to invest trust funds in any bonds
in which cautious and intelligent persons do not invest their own
money." 21
An analysis of the decisions subsequent to the enactment of
the statute is rendered difficult by the absence of cases precisely
2o Among such securities were bonds of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation
(Laws 1933-4, First Sp. Sess., p. 45, § 1), the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation
(Laws 1935, p. 3, § 1), and the individual or consolidatel bonds of the Federal
Land Banks (Laws 1937, p. 1223, § 1). Bonds or notes secured by mortgage or
trust deed insured by the Federal Housing Administrator, or debentures issued
by him, were included by Laws 1937, p. 1222, § 1, as were the bonds, debentures
or other obligations of a Federal Home Loan Bank, or of two or more such banks,
whether issued jointly or jointly and severally. That same amendment added the
insured shares of federally chartered savings and loan associations, provided such
shares were insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.
The first mortgage bonds of any corporation of any state qualifying under the
terms of the Federal Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Law of the State
of Illinois, whether issued in whole or in part to refund any first mortgage bonds
of such corporation eligible for investment under the statute at the time of re-
funding, were added by Laws 1935, pp. 3-4, § 1.
21 Il. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 148, § 32.
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involving investments, and by the mixture of improper activities
generally appearing in those cases which seek to surcharge trus-
tees. As recently observed by a noted authority on the subject, 22
surcharges
.. arise most often out of situations which involve a mosaic
of negligence or default; a supine failure to administer the
trust, a failure to account, a breach of the duty of loyalty, an
undue retention, an unwarranted delegation of the trust duties
or, more likely, a combination of one or more of those defi-
ciencies. It appears to be true that a surcharge almost never
is founded upon the single ground that the trustee purchased
a security which was not permitted to him . . . Discussion of
the danger of surcharge to the trustee is not likely to be
clearly resolved at any early date. One of the chief reasons
is that records of surcharge are obscure. The habitat of the
surcharge is in the courts of first instance, and since records
are not readily available of the many adjustments and settle-
ments which take place in those courts, the statistics upon
the incidence of surcharge in every day practice are spotty
and unreliable. 23
Bearing in mind these facts, not too much in the way of enlighten-
ment should be expected from the cases decided by our courts of
review, and, in fact, not too much aid is given. To simplify a
consideration of the decisions, the cases may be grouped in three
broad classifications: (1) cases primarily concerned with the
propriety of a trustee's investment, (2) cases primarily concerned
with the propriety of a trustee's retention of securities, and
(3) cases primarily concerned with a trustee's administration of
the trust estate. This grouping is admittedly arbitrary, particu-
larly because the issues are not usually well defined. However,
the courts have frequently drawn distinctions on a similar basis,
and such a treatment may assist in a proper evaluation of the
cases.
22 Shattuck, "The Massachusetts Prudent Man in Trust Investments,"- 25 Boston
U. L. Rev. 307 (1945).
23 Ibid., at p. 311.
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A. PROPRIETY OF INVESTMENT
The first significant decision subsequent to the 1905 Act was that
of Merchants Loan & Trust Company v. The Northern Trust
Company.2 4 The court was there confronted with the duty of
construing portions of the will of the late Marshall Field relating
to the trustees' power to invest in real estate located in the State
of Illinois and elsewhere in the United States and also to acquire
a pro rata share of any increase of capital stock offered them by a
corporation, shares of stock of which corporation were part of the
assets delivered to the trustees at the time of the testator's death.
The court determined that the will granted the trustees discretion
to make such investments, rejected the contention that the 1905
Act controlled the trustee in making investments, and held that
the statute applied only to those cases where the trust instrument
was either silent concerning investments or referred to the statute
in that regard, so that, in this respect, the statute was permissive
rather than mandatory. The court pointed out that investments
other than those named in the statute might be authorized by a
trust instrument, and said:
Where the will gives authority to the trustees to . . . invest
and re-invest, in their discretion, the trustees may purchase
such securities as a prudent and provident person would
purchase as good and safe investfnents, and they are not
restricted to the conditions and limitations imposed by law
for the investment of trust funds.25
The court was not required to decide, and did not decide, the
effect of the statute in. a situation where a trustee was given no
special direction or discretion in the trust instrument with respect
to investments, but it did make the following comment:
In the management and investment of trust property the will
provides that the trustees shall have regard for the certainty
of the income rather than the amount, and this is the general
rule. The law does not give trustees the same freedom of
choice in investments that may be exercised by prudent
24 250 Iln. 86, 95 N. E. 59 (1911).
25 250 Ill. 86 at 93, 95 N. E. 59 at 61-2.
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businessmen in their own affairs. It permits the trustee to
assume no risks in his investment other than those that are
inseparable from every species of property. "Absolute free-
dom from risk is impossible. The most stable forms of prop-
erty may lose ther value; lands may depreciate; even nations
may become bankrupt. From these reasons which inhere in
every kind of ownership the law doeg not pretend to save the
beneficiary but from the risk growing out of the uncertainty
of speculative investments the law does protect him by mak-
ing the trustee personally responsible for all trust, funds
invested by him in such a manner," unless upon the express
direction in the instrument creating the trust or statutory
permission... . The trustees must always and ever, in exer-
cising their powers, act in the utmost good faith and with
sound judgment and prudence. 26
The quoted statement confuses the issue because although the
-ourt enunciates a standard of prudence, it implies that a trustee
[s bound by a higher degree of prudence than an ordinary indi-
vidual. This implication was, however, explained by the court's.
omment on "speculative investments" which contains the key to
he court's language. A man of prudence, discretion and intelli-
oence may invest a portion of his funds in a speculative venture
ivith the primary purpose of increasing his capital or of obtain-
.ng a high return on his investment. A trustee may not so specu-
late, but this does not mean that his activities are to be judged
)y a different standard of prudence than that exercised by men
)f prudence, discretion and intelligence in the management of
,heir own affairs. The prohibition against speculation is an
ibsolute limitation on a trustee's powers unless, as recognized by
;he court, such speculation is expressly directed in the trust
nstrument. It is to be noted that speculation is expressly pro-
Aibited in the Prudent Man Rule ;27 and, in this respect, the deci-
don announced the same rule as is contained in the new Act.28
26 250 Il1. 86 at 96, 95 N. E. 59 at 63.
27 ". . . not in regard to speculation but in regard to the permanent disposition
,f their funds.... ." See Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 at 461.
28 Laws 1945, p. 1779, § 1; I1. Rev. Stat. 1945; Ch. 148, § 32.
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In the later case of Illinois Trust & Savings Bank v. Tuley,29
the court passed upon the propriety of a trustee's purchase of
first mortgage bonds of the Chicago City Railway Company.
The bonds had declined in value because of a general increase in
prevailing interest rates. The court held that the investment
complied with the statute, and was proper even if no statute had
been in existence, and stated:
If the trustee acted in good faith and the investment was such
as would have been made by cautious, prudent and intelligent
business men with a view to securing a safe income, and
further is in compliance with the statute of this State, then
the trustee cannot be held responsible for consequences which
could not have been foreseen at the time the investment was
made .3 0
This decision indicates a clear interpretation of the purpose of the
1905 Act in its application of a standard of prudence to invest-
ments within the prescribed limitations.
The trustee concerned in the case of In re Estate of Sanders,31
however, was surcharged for the cost of investments in bonds of a
hotel corporation and of another building corporation. At the
time of the purchase of the bonds, taxes were unpaid for one or
more years, and subsequently taxes for later years were not paid.
The trustee made no investigation of this fact nor of the fact that
the income from the properties fell below the estimates made in
the prospectus describing the bonds. It also appeared that the
trustee had made a personal profit on the bond purchases. The
court found that although the trustee was granted some discre-
tion concerning his investments, the terms of the trust instrument
limited him to securities of the "same kind and character as
government bonds and first farm mortgagds." The court further
found that the trustee had failed to exercise the discretion re-
quired of him because "he invested in the Park Lane Corporation
practically the entire trust fund" and in an enterprise which was
29 226 Ill. App. 491 (1922).
30 226 Ill. App. 491 at 499. Italics added.
31 304 Il. App. 57, 25 N. E. (2d) 923 (1940).
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new and untried and whose success had not been established. The
court recognized that an investment by a trustee in participating
first mortgage bonds would be proper only "when authorized by
the instrument creating the trust." The case merits additional
note, however, because the court announced a prudent man
standard in the following language:
When we take into consideration all of the many provisions of
the trust deeds securing these bonds, we may have no hesi-
tancy in holding that they are not sucP investments as the
provisions of the will . . . authorized. Appellant was not
• investing his own money. He should only have taken such
risks as a reasonably prudent man would have taken who
was charged with the duty of investing money either for
himself or for others. He knew it was of the utmost im-
portance that the principal as well as the interest should be
forthcoming at the appointed timeA2
]k still further illustration of the application of a rule of
prudence in investments made within the scope of the 1905 Act is
contained in Campbell v. Albers.3 3 The trustees there were sur-
charged for the purchase of bonds of a hotel corporation already
in default for several years in its taxes, as well as for engaging
in a transaction motivated by self-interest. The court commented
on these acts by saying:
Section 1 of the act concerning the powers of trustees .
which provides that investments of trust funds by trustees
may be in first mortgage bonds of any corporation upon
which no default in payment of interest shall have occurred
for a period of five years, does not purport to sanction or
permit such an investment where the bonds are otherwise
unsafe, or to excuse the trustees from making a proper in-
vestigation as to the safety and propriety of such an invest-
ment.4
32 304 I1. App. 57 at 67, 25 N. E. (2d) 923 at 928.
33 313 Ill. App. 152, 39 N. E. (2d) 672 (1942).
34 313 Ill. App. 152 at 165, 39 N. E. (2d) 672 at 679.
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A study of the foregoing cases involving trustee investments
during the period of the 1905 Act clearly reveals that tle statute
wrought no change in applicable legal principles. Although the
decisions are not numerous, they do adequately illustrate the
judicial interpretation of the statute.
B. PROPRIETY OF RETENTION
A segregation of the cases involving a trustee's retention of
securities is justified not only for the realistic reason that a dif-
ferent problem is presented, but also because the Illinois courts
have generally recognized a distinction between retention and
investment. Thus, in Hatfield v. First National Bank of Danville,35
the court refused to hold a trustee liable for alleged negligence in
retaining and failing to sell shares of national bank stock received
as part of the truest estate, despite the plaintiff's contention that
the stock was an improper investment, saying:
Trustees must employ such diligence and prudence as men
of discretion and intelligence in such matters employ in their
own like affairs. In determining whether a trustee has acted
prudently, courts must look at the facts as they existed un-
aided by subsequent events. The court, in determining lia-
bility of trustees, must distinguish between trustee's invest-
ment of trust funds and making or failing to make prompt
disposition of securities received from creator of trust. Ordi-
narily, trustees who act honestly and with ordinary prudence
are not liable for mere errors of judgment .... The court is
not required to hold honest trustees liable for loss sustained
by retaining an unauthorized security if the trustee acted
honestly and prudently. A trustee receiving stock in tes-
tator's estate under direction to continue the investment, will
not, in the absence of negligence, fraud or other improper
conduct, become liable for losses resulting from an honest
mistake in judgment in the retention of stock in a declining
market, before making sale thereof. A wisdom developed
a 317 Ill. App. 169, 46 N. E. (2d) 94 (1942).
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after an event and having it and its consequences as its direct
source, is a standard no man should be judged by.38
A bill for accounting was filed in People v. Canton National
Bank 7 against the receiver of a bank which had acted, prior to
its closing, as trustee of a testamentary trust. The chief issue was
the trustee's failure to sell shares of stock in its own bank which
it had received as part of the trust estate. The defendant urged
that under the terms of the 1905 Act, which provided in part that
''any trustee or any and all successors in trust may continue to
hold any investment received by him under the trust, or any
increase thereof," the trustee was expressly authorized to con-
tinue to hold the stock received as part of the trust estate. The
court overruled this contention, applying again a rule of prudence,
and stated: "In our judgment the statute above referred to does
not give trustees the power and authority to hold stock received
with the trust estate for any particular length of time but only for
such period as the facts and circumstances of each particular case
may warrant. "38 The court also pointed out that the retention of
the stock placed the trustee in a position where it was difficult to
be honest and faithful to its trust because of the personal interest
of the bafik.
The final account by the executor in the case of In re Estate
of Busby"9 showed that none of the legacies and only certain of
the claims against the estate had been paid, and that the estate
was insolvent. The court found that the estate, at the time of
decedent's death, consisted largely of securities of a speculative
character held on about a one-third margin and propounded the
following question:
The executor's good faith in the instant case is not questioned,
but there is the question as to whether its opinions were
prudently formed and its judgment warranted by the circum-
stances. Did the executor act as an ordinarily prudent and
36 317 I1. App. 169 at 177, 46 N. E. (2d) 94 at 98.
37 288 Il. App. 418, -6 N. E. (2d) 220 (1937).
38 288 I1. App. 418 at 428. 6 N. E. (2d) 220 at 224.
39 288 I1. App. 500, 6 N. E. (2d) 451 (1937).
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cautious person who was the trustee of the money and prop-
erty of others would have acted under similar circum-
stances 740
If the court was drawing a'distinction between a "prudent man"
and a "prudent trustee," such a distinction was unnecessary, for
the "prudent man" designated in the field of trust investments is
an individual who does not speculate. This matter of speculation
lies at the heart of the court's statement, for the court, in holding
that the executor "had no right to continue decedent's speculation
with the assets of the estate in the condition they were," re-
marked:
This is not a case where the securities were owned outright
or held on a conservative margin, or where the estate was in
a strong position and able to carry through an emergency.
As has been heretofore stated, each case of this character
must be decided on its own particular and distinctive facts.
When the estate came into the hands of the executor, it con-
sisted of a huge speculation ... 41
Pank v. Chicago Title & Trust Company42 involved a co-
trustee's liability for an exchange of shares of preferred stock
for shares of common stock in the same corporation. The will
had authorized the trustees to retain "any shares of capital stock
in the... Fairbanks Morse & Co.... which I may own at the time
of my death." Holding the trustee not liable, the court said:
The principle is well established that "The care and prudence
to be exercised by trustees is that which ordinary men would
exercise under like circumstances in connection with their
own affairs." If a trustee has exercised the care and judg-
ment of ordinarily prudent men in their own affairs he will
not be chargeable for mere errors of judgment nor for acci-
dental injuries and losses.43
40288 Ill. App. 500 at 520, 6 N. E. (2d) 451 at 459.
41 288 Il1. App. 500 at 522, 6 N. E. (2d) 451 at 460.
42 314 Il. App. 53, 40 N. E. (2d) 787 (1942).
43 314 Ill. App. 53 at 65, 40 N. E. (2d) 787 at 791.
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A frequently cited case is Christy v. Christy44 involving the
action of an administrator in selling shares of stock in a ferry
company, the ordinary market value of which was $250 per share,
for $600 per share during a period when rival corporations were
buying up the stock to gain control. The heirs attempted to sur-
charge the administrator on the ground that other persons had
obtained as high as $1500 per share. The record showed that the
administrator had sold his own stock at the same price as the
stock of the estate, and that different prices were paid for the
stock on the same day. In holding that the administrator was not
liable, the court declared:
In the performance of his duties an administrator must act
with the highest degree of fidelity and with the utmost good
faith, but he is held to the exercise of only that degree of
skill and diligence which an ordinarily prudent man bestows
on his own similar private affairs. Nothing iiiore can be re-
quired of him, and if his acts will stand the test of that rule
he cannot be held liable for any loss that may be sustained by
the estate of his intestate.45
An early statement of a rule of prudence with respect to re-
tention is to be found in Kaufman v. Loomis.4 6 In that case a bank,
as co-trustee, held certain securities in trust for the payment of
several loans guaranteed by the other co-trustee. The securities
consisted of releases of a patent claim as well as for damages in a
suit for infringement which had been successfully prosecuted and
affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the United States.
The cases were awaiting decision in the United States Supreme
Court. Pending this decision, the defendants in these actions
offered $11,000 for the releases, but the bank refused to sell for
less than $15,000. The Supreme Court reversed the holdings of
the lower courts and thereby the releases became worthless. The
guarantor sought to avoid obligation on the notes on the ground
44 225 Ill. 547, 80 N. E. 242 (1907).
45 225 Ill. 547 at 552, 80 N. E. 242 at 243.
48110 Ill. 617 (1884).
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that the bank had breached its trust in refusing to sell. The court
held that no breach of trust had occurred, stating:
If, in good faith, as trustee, he exercised his honest judgment
in so refusing, and acted, as he supposed, for the best inter-
ests of all concerned,-unless that judgment was grossly
erroneous, with the lights he had,-he surely can not be
charged with wronging any one by acting upon his judgment.
The mere fact that it turned out afterwards that he was
mistaken, does not charge him with a wrong done to any one.47
This decision evidences a reasonable conception of the problems
of retention which confront a trustee.
C. PROPRIETY OF ADMINISTRATION
There are numerous Illinois cases dealing with a trustee's
duties in the administration of the trust estate. The decisions
appear to use the terms "administer" and "manage" inter-
changeably, and evidence a clear and consistent application of a
rule of prudence during the periods both prior to and subsequent
to the enactment of the 1905 Act.
Thus, in the early case of Christy v. McBride,48 an adminis-
trator employed an agent in another state to collect notes due the
intestate. The agent collected the money, appropriated it to his
own use, and later became insolvent. In holding the administrator
not liable for this loss, the court said:
If an administrator has acted for the benefit of the estate,
used proper diligence, and acted with ordinary care and cir-
cumspection in the discharge of his trust, he ought not to be
held answerable for losses which could not have been fore-
seen, and which ordinary precaution may not 'guard against.
The general principle which seems to run through all the
authorities, as to his liability, recognize the doctrine, that if
he acts honestly and prudently, though there be a loss to, or
47 110 Il. 617 at 626.
48 2 11. 74 (1832).
PRUDENT MAN INVESTMENT STATUTE
diminution of, the testator's estate or rights, he will not be
liable.49
Similarly, in Rowan v. Kirkpatrick,o the court stated that
,"an administrator who has acted in good faith in the collection of
the debts due his intestate, and intended fully and fairly to dis-
charge his duty in that respect, ought not, if his intentions have
been directed by a reasonable judgment in the matter, to be
charged with the loss of debts he has failed to collect." Again,
in Clardy v. Smith,51 the court refused to charge a trustee who
had allowed two secured notes for loans to become due and remain
overdue. The trustee had collected the interest regularly, but the
securities depreciated in value below the sums secured. Counsel
agreed that the trustee was required to exercise the same care and
prudence in the management of the estate which ordinary men
would exercise in connection with their own affairs, and the court
stated that "they are not chargeable for mere errors of judgment
nor for accidental injuries or losses." In Waterman v. Alden, -5 2
however, the court charged the trustee for failing to enforce col-
lection of the notes of a debtor whom the trustee, while acting as
an officer of a creditor bank, had been pressing for the collection
of other debts. The court found that the notes might have been
collected or secured by the use of ordinary business diligence and
stated- that the rule "undoubtedly is, that they must discharge
the duties of their trust to the best of their skill and ability, with
such care and diligence as men fit to be entrusted with such mat-
ters may fairly be expected to put forth in their own business of
equal importance."- 3
In Whitney v. Peddicord54 the executors did not redeem land
owned by the estate from a mortgage sale, because, at the time, the
value of the land was only equal to the amount necessary to re-
49 2 Ill. 74 at 78.
5o 14 Il1. 1 (1852).
51 273 Ill. App. 339 (1934).
52 144 I1. 90, 32 N. E. 972 (1893).
53 144 I1. 90 at 100, 32 N. E. 972 at 973.
54 63 I1. 249 (1872):
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deem. The mortgaged land subsequently increased in value. The
court refused to hold the executors liable, saying: "We can not
charge these executors with official delinquency merely because
they failed correctly to forecast the future. They acted in this mat-
ter with reasonable wisdom and discretion, and nothing further can
be required." 55 The question was presented, in Wahl v. Schmidt,56
whether a tort judgment obtained by a third person for injuries
received through the negligence of the employees managing a
building owned by the trust estate was a judgment against the
trustee personally or in his official capacity. The court held that
the trustee should be allowed the loss in his account because the
negligence of his servants did not indicate a failure on his part
to act in "good faith and common prudence." Yaple v. Mahy57
involved the propriety of a payment by the administrator of a
proportionate assessment levied against stockholders of a bank
of which the estate owned shares of capital stock. The assessment
was required to make up a deficiency found by the bank examiners
in the assets of the bank, but the bank subsequently became in-
solvent. The court held this payment by the administrator to be
proper, stating that the general principle running through all the
authorities is that if a trustee acts "honestly and prudently,
though there be a loss to, or diminution of, the testator's estate
or rights, he will not be liable." 5  Another case, that of Suffolk v.
Leiter,59 contains a concise statement of the rule to be applied and
the basic reasons therefor. That case arose on a bill seeking the
removal of a trustee on a variety of claims of mismanagement
and misconduct, which bill the court dismissed. It said:
The law requires that a trustee must act in good faith in the
management of all matters relating to the trust, and employ
such vigilance, sagacity and diligence as prudent men of in-
telligence ordinarily employ in their own affairs. A trustee
who in an honest effort to serve his trust errs in his judgment
55 63 Il. 249 at 250.
56 307 I1. 331, 138 N. E. 604 (1923).
57 241 Ill. App. 446 (1926).
58 241 Ill. App. 446 at 451.
59261 ni. App. 82 (1931).
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will not be condemned. If the rule were otherwise, it would
not be possible to induce any person to act as trustee and
assume the risk of losses which might result from mistakes
of judgment.60
A recapitulation of the foregoing cases discloses (1) that it
has always been the law in Illinois that where the instrument
creating the trust granted broad investment powers to the trustee,
or invested him with discretion in the matter of making invest-
ments, the trustee was governed in his investment activities by a
rule substantially, if not exactly, the Same as that stated in the
new Prudent Man Investment Statute ;61 (2) that if the trust in-
strument was silent as to a trustee's powers of investment, or
restricted him to "legal investments," the trustee was limited in
his choice of investments to those enumerated by the legislative
list,62 or the judicial fiat before the list,68 but even in making a
choice from this limited list, a trustee could not blindly select his
investments, but was bound by a similar rule of prudence in
choosing from the list;64 and (3) with respect to retaining invest-
ments the same rule of prudence was applied 5 although there is
some indication in this class of cases of a greater leniency.68
Similarly, courts of review in Illinois have uniformly applied the
rule of prudence to all phases of a trustee's activities connected
with the administration of the trust estate.67
60 261 Ill. App. 82 at 118.
61 Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Trust Co., 250 Ill. 86, 95 N. E. 59
(1911) ; Illinois Trust & Savings Bank v. Tuley, 226 Ill. App. 491 (1922).
62 Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Trust Co., 250 Ill. 86, 95 N. E. 59
1911).
63 Penn v. Fogler, 182 Ill. 76, 55 N. E. 192 (1899); White v. Sherman, 168 Ill.
i89, 48 N. E. 128 (1897) ; Butler v. Butler, 164 Ii1. 171, 45 N. E. 426 (1896) ; Sholty
T. Sholty, 140 Ill. 81, 29 N. E. 1041 (1892).
64 Campbell v. Albers, 313 Ill. App. 152, 39 N. E. (2d) 672 (1942).
65 Christy v. Christy, 225 Ill. 547, 80 N. E. 242 (1907) ; Kaufman v. Loomis, 110
11. 617 (1884) ; Hatfield v. First National Bank, 317 Ill. App. 169. 46 N. E. (2d) 94
'1942); Pank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 314 Ill. App. 53, 40 N. E. (2d) 787
1942) ; In re Estate of Busby, 288 Ill. App. 500, 6 N. E. (2d) 451 (1937) ; People
'.Canton National Bank, 288 I1. App. 418, 6 N. E. (2d) 220 (1937).
66 Hatfield v. First National Bank, 317 Ill. App. 169, 46 N. E. (2d) 94 (1942).
67 See cases discussed in notes 48 to 60, ante.
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III. EFFECT OF THE NEW STATUTE
Having thus examined the prior judicial decisions and legisla-
tive enactments, a comparison of the new Act with the former
law is in order. The question obviously raised is, "What change
or effect does the new Act have on Illinois law?" By way of
answer to this query, it must first be pointed out that the statute,
broadly viewed, purports to cover the same three primary func-
tions of trustees previously discussed, namely: (1) the propriety
of making investments, (2) the retention of existing investments,
and (3) the management of trust properties. Concerning each
of these functions, the new Act declares a standard of prudence
not dissimilar to that previously announced by the courtsAs
To appreciate the effect of the statute on these functions of
trustees, it is necessary to consider some varied general situations
to which the statute may have application. For example, if a
trust instrument enumerates particular investments which may
be acquired or retained by a trustee, the new Act does not author-
ize the trustee to disregard such enumeration. 9 On the contrary,
he is bound by such a designation, as was the case under the
former law.70 Similarly, if a trust instrument specifies particular
classes of investments which a trustee is authorized to acquire or
retain, his activities in acquiring or investing within these classes
are governed by a rule of prudence no different than under the
former law.71 A distinct advantage of the new Act to trustees in
the management of discretionary trusts lies in its express recog-
nition of "bonds, debentures and other corporate obligations,
stocks, preferred or common, and real estate mortgages" as
proper investments for the trust accounts if selected in accordance
with the Prudent Man Rule. 72 The great change effected by the
new Act is not in any rule of law, but is in the opening up of a
68 Section 1 of the Act contains a virtually verbatim reiteration of the rule an-
nounced by Mr. Justice Putnam in Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.)
446.
69 Laws 1945, p. 1779, § la; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 148, § 32.1a.
7o See In re Estate of Sanders, 304 Ill. App. 57, 25 N. E. (2d) 923 (1940).
71 Campbell v. Albers, 313 Ill. App. 152, 39 N. E. (2d) 672 (1942).
72 Laws 1945, p. 1779, § 1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 148, § 32.
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broad field of investments to those trusts heretofore restricted to
so-called "legal investments." Prior to the adoption of the new
Act, if the trust instrument was silent regarding investments, or
specified "legal investments" or words of similar import, the
trustee when making investments was restricted to the legal list.7 3
But now, the whole field of investments is open to the funds of
such trusts, provided only that the trustee "shall exercise the
judgment and care under the circumstances then prevailing, which
men of prudence, discretion and intelligence exercise in the man-
agement of their own affairs, not in regard to speculation but in
regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering
the probable income as well as the probable safety of their
capital. ',74
This enlargement of the scope of investments must be accom-
panied by a note of caution in instances where the trust instru-
ment specifies "legal investments" or uses language of similar
import. Generally, such words mean "legal" at the time the
investment is made rather than the provision in force at some
prior time.75 However, such phraseology must be examined and
construed in the. light of the entire trust instrument to ascertain
that the language used does not restrict the trustee's investments
to a "legal list" in force as of a particular time. If the instru-
ment does accomplish such a restriction, it is the same as if such
"legal list" were incorporated in the trust instrument, and the
trustee would be bound thereby.
In thus extending the field of investments available to trus-
tees, the new Act balances the conflicting interests of life bene-
ficiaries and of remaindermen. Obviously, life beneficiaries are
chiefly concerned with the income produced by the trust estate;
the remaindermen are primarily interested in the safety of the
principal. Any rule which results in special consideration being
given either of these interests operates to the detriment of the
73 See notes 62-3, ante.
74 Laws 1945, p. 1779, § 1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 148, § 32.
75 See cases cited in note 81, post.
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other. Thus, the purchase of speculative investments to secure'a
high yield sacrifices the safety of the principal; and by the same
token, an extreme concentration of trust funds in ultra-conserva-
tive investments may deprive the life beneficiaries of the income
which the creator of the trust desired to provide for them. The
new Act is designed to effect a fair compromise between these
opposing interests, for a trustee is enjoined to consider "the prob-
able income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be
invested."
This purpose of the Prudent Man Rule has been recognized by
the courts of Massachusetts, and has been expounded. in numerous
cases. For example, in the case of Dickinson, Appellant," the
court said:
a trustee must, so far as is reasonably practicable, hold
the balance even between the claims of the life-tenants and
those of the remaindermen. The life-tenants desire a large
income from the trust property, but they are only entitled to
such an income as it can earn when invested in such securities
as a prudent man, investing his own money, and having re-
gard to the permanent disposition of the fund, would consider
safe. A prudent man, possessed of considerable wealth, in
investing a small part of his property, may wisely enough
take risks which a trustee would not be justified in taking.
A trustee, whose duty it is to keep the trust fund safely
invested in productive property, ought not to hazard the
safety of the property under any temptation to make ex-
traordinary profits. Our cases, however, show that trustees
in this commonwealth are permitted to invest portions of
trust-funds in dividend-paying stocks and interest-bearing
bonds of private corporations, when the corporations haqe
acquired, by reason of the amount of their property and the
prudent management of their affairs, such a reputation that
cautious and intelligent persons commonly invest their own
money in such stock and bonds as permanent investments. 77
76 152 Mass. 184, 25 N. E. 99 (1890).
77 152 Mass. 184 at 187, 25 N. E. 99 at 100.
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In an earlier case, that of Kinmonth v. Brigham,78 the same court
stated:
But although in this commonwealth there are no investments
regarded as so absolutely secure as to make a choice of them
obligatory upon trustees, and in all cases a considerable
latitude is allowed, yet it has never been held that trustees for
successive takers were at liberty to disregard the security of
the capital, in order to increase the income. Nor, where
property is of a wasting nature, is an investment in it: con-
sistent with their duty, in the absence of specific directions in
the creation of the trust. They are equally bound to preserve
the capital of the fund for the benefit of the remainderman,
and to secure the usual rate of income upon safe investments
for the tenant for life; and to use a sound discretion in refer-
ence to each of these objects. If there is no specific direction,
and they are charged merely with the general duty to invest,
they cannot postpone the yielding of income for the increase
of the capital, nor select a wasting or hazardous investment
for the sake of greater present profit. And the rule is the
same in regard to property which comes to the trustee from
the testator, not specifically bequeathed, as it is in regard to
making new investments. If the investment is not such as this
court would sustain them in making, it should not be allowed
to continue, but should be converted.
79
While the rule of prudence contained in the new Act affords
reasonable protection for remaindermen and life beneficiaries, it
does further achieve an important benefit for the latter individuals,
to-wit: the earning of a higher yield than is now possible by the
purchase of "legals" under existing economic conditions. It is
common knowledge that trustees today, with funds available for
investment, are confronted with the lowest interest rates of all
times. Accordingly, the returns to beneficiaries from restricted
investments on legal lists are exceedingly low. The new Act, by
78 87 Mass. 270 (1862).
79 87 Mass. 270 at 278.
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increasing the scope of a trustee's investments, signifies to bene-
ficiaries an answer to the dilemma of steadily decreasing yields
in the face of constantly increasing demands for fiduciary invest-
ment outlets. The need for relief from this situation has been
apparent for some years. The new Act points the way to a, solu-
tion of the problem.
In addition to enlarging the scope of investments permitted
trustees, with the attendant advantages outlined above, the new
Act accomplishes certain formal changes of aid to those concerned
with trust estates. These accomplishments can best be observed
by a consideration of the provisions of the Act itself. Section 1
is undoubtedly the most important part of the statute as it em-
bodies the statement of the Prudent Man Rule in substantially the
same language as that used by Mr. Justice Putnam over one
hundred and fifteen years ago. This section, therefore, crystallizes
into a time-proven, definitive statement a rule of prudence which,
although recognized by the Illinois courts, has not been always
uniformly or clearly stated. The new Act resolves any confusion
resulting from prior judicial decisions concerning a possible dif-
ference between a "prudent man" rule and a "prudent trustee"
rule; the Illinois legislature has unequivocally adopted a "prudent
man" rule. Section 1 further makes this same rule of prudence
applicable to all phases of a trustee's activities, thereby removing
any doubt concerning distinctions in the standard of care required
for investment, retention or management. Finally, Section 1
expressly provides that the Act is applicable to "any trust
heretofore or hereafter created." This provision permits a uni-
form treatment of all trusts not specifically controlled by the
terms of the trust instrument. No doubt is entertained concerning
the validity of this portion of the Act, and it is submitted that the
Act would have been applicable to trusts created prior to its
effective date even without an express provision. It is stated, in
Scott on Trusts, that "where a statute specifies the types of in-
vestment which are legal for trustees the provisions which are in
force at the time when the investment is made are controlling,
rather than the provisions in force at the time when the trust
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was created." 0  Although Illinois courts have not passed on this
exact question, there are numerous authorities elsewhere sustain-
ing this statement,8' and there would seem to be no reason why the
Illinois courts should not follow this line of authority.
Section la accomplishes two objectives. First, it provides
that the Act shall not be construed as authorizing or requiring
any departure from the express terms or limitations set forth in
the instrument creating or defining the trustee's duties and
powers; and second, it brings within the purview of the Act any
instrument which defines the extent of a trustee's authority to
invest by the use of the terms "legal investment," "authorized
investment," or similar phrases. Of course, as to trusts created
prior to the effective date of the Act, if such phrase in the trust
instrument is accompanied by language indicating an intention
to restrict the trustee to investments legal at the time of the crea-
tion of the trust, then the result is the same as if the trustor had
incorporated the then legal list in the trust instrument, and the
trustee would have to follow such directions. 2 Section lb insures
that the provisions of the Act will not be construed as an attempt
to deprive a court of competent jurisdiction from permitting a
trustee to deviate from the terms of the trust instrument. Courts
of chancery, in Illinois have frequently permitted trustees to
deviate from the terms of the trust instrument to preserve, trust
estates from destruction. 3 Section lc defines the words "trust"
and "trustee" in sufficiently broad teirms to embrace all situations
intended to be covered.
so Scott on Trusts, Vol. 2, p. 1217.
S Aydelott v. Breeding, 111 Ky. 847, 64 S. W. 916 (1901) ; Clarke v. Hayes, 75
Mass. 426 (1857) ; Reinhardt v. National State Bank, 130 N. J. Eq. 34, 20 A. (2d)
654 (1941); Reiner v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 126 N. J. Eq. 78, 8 A. (2d) 175
(1939), reversed on other grounds 127 N. J. Eq. 377, 13 A. (2d) 291 (1940) ; City
Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Evans, 255 App. Div. 135, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 406 (1938) ;
Re Hamersley's Estate, 152 Misc. 903, 274 N. Y. S. 303 (1934). See also Land
Commissioners v. Kaskaskia Commons, 249 Ill. 578, 94 N. E. 970 (1911).
82 Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Trust Co., 250 Ill. 86, 95 N. E. 59
(1911).
83 See Cary v. Cary, 309 Ill. 330, 141 N. E. 156 (1923); Johns v. Montgomery,
265 Ill. 21, 106 N. E. 497 (1914) ; Marsh v. Reed, 184 Ill. 263, 56 N. E. 306 (1900);
New Jersey Bank & Tr. Co. v. Lincoln Mortgage & T. G. Co., 105 N. J. Eq. 557,
148 A. 713 (1930).
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It is important to. note that the new Act does not apply to
investments for conservatorship and guardianship estates. The
investments for such estates are still controlled by the sections of
the Probate Act dealing therewith.
4
IV. INVESTMENTS PERMITTED UNDER THE NEW ACT
Any study of the new Act logically invites an inquiry relative
to the investments which are permitted pursuant to the Prudent
Man Rule which it pronounces. A sound interpretation of the
statute precludes, in one sense, a reply to this question.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in which state the rule
has prevailed the longest, has determined each case coming before
it on its own merits, applying the rule to the facts of the particular
case. 5 It has not permitted a decision concerning an investment
in one case to be a precedent in another case.86 The Massachu-
setts court recognizes that an investment held to be improper in
one case might, because of changing conditions, be proper at a
later date and that an investment improper for one trust might at
the same time be proper for another.8 7
It is to be hoped that the Illinois courts will be careful to
follow this practice of the Massachusetts courts, otherwise they
will, over a period of years, create a new "legal list" by virtue
of court decision rather than by legislative enactment. It may
then become necessary to go back to the legislature to get a
statutory legal list in order to get away from the judicial one. It
should be the concern of lawyers and courts, and indeed of every
one interested in trust administration in this state, to see that the
84 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 3, §§ 412-5.
85 For example, in Taft v. Smith, 186 Mass. 31, 70 N. E. 1031 (1904), the court
refused to hold a trustee liable for loss incurred on a purchase money second
mortgage under the particular facts of the case, although it recognized generally
that a trustee must not invest in second mortgages. See also Hunt v. Appellant,
141 Mass. 515, 6 N. E. 554 (1886).
86 Dickinson, Appellant, 152 Mass. 184, 25 N. E. 99 (1890), involved two successive
purchases of Union Pacific Railroad Co. stock. The court approved the first
purchase and disallowed the second.
87 This results from the flexible application given the rule in Massachusetts.
See cases cited in notes 85-6, ante, and also see note 88.
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Illinois courts do not take the position that because a certain
characer of investment has been approved or disapproved at one
time and for a certain trust, that it thereby stands approved or
disapproved for all time as to all trusts. In this light, it seems
unnecessary to review the decisions, either from Massachusetts
or the other states which have adopted the Prudent Man Rule, or
to list investments which have been held to be proper or improper
under that rule.88 To do so would serve no useful purpose, might
mislead those who are acting as trustees, and would be doing the
very thing here inveighed against.
By the same token, it is not believed that it is here necessary
to endeavor to sketch or portray the "prudent man" described
by the statute. This would be simply another way of trying to
delineate within precise bounds the'specific investments which are
proper for a trustee. The moment the courts or the bar begin to
analyze exact fact situations as a guide to similar fact situations,
a step backwards will be taken toward the formulation of another
legal list. The virtue of the new Act is its flexibility, its elas-
ticity. Conderning such elasticity, the Massachusetts court, in
Kimball v. Whitney,89 said:
Good faith and sound discretion, as these terms ought to be
understood by reasonable men of good judgment, were thus
made the standard by which the conduct of trustees is to be
measured. That is a comprehensive principle. It is wide in
its scope. It is not limited to a particular time or a special
neighborhood. It is general and inclusive, so that while re-
maining itself fixed, it may continue to be a safe guide under
new financial institutions and business customs, changed com-
mercial methods and practices, altered monetary usages and
investment combinations.. It avoids the inflexibility of definite
classification of securities, it disregards the optimism of the
promoter, and eschews the exuberance of the speculator. It
holds fast to common sense and depends on practical experi-
88 A thorough review of the Massachusetts decision§ under the Prudent Man
Rule may be found in Shattuck, "The Massachusetts Prudent Man in Trust In-
vestments," 25 Boston U. L. Rev. 307 (1945).
89233 Mass. 321, 123 N. E. 665 (1919).
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ence. It is susceptible of being adapted to whatever condi-
tions may arise in the evolution of society and the progress
of civilization. Although more liberal to investing trustees
than the law of some states and countries, it has frequently
been reaffirmed and never doubted in this jurisdiction.90
The importance of judicial expressions elsewhere construing
the Prudent Man Rule lies not in the -type of investments ap-
proved or condemned by the courts, but in the reasons which
moved the courts to approve or condemn. These reasons are
grounded in a given trustee's failure to comply with one or more
of the three elements involved in the rule-care, skill and caution.
But, these are general statements which constitute little improve-
ment over the language of the Prudent Man Rule. To a trustee
imbued with the concept of a definite guide supposedly furnished
by the legal list, and hence grasping for similarly specific assist-
ance in the terms of the new Act, such phrases will prove of little
help. The answer to this problem is a blunt one-the new Act is
not designed as a crutch to bolster the confidence of uncertain
trustees. As one author states, a trustee
is under a duty to make such an investigation as a prudent
man would make under the circumstances. He should take
int(i consideration the past history of any security which he
proposes to purchase and its future prospects. His conclu-
sion as to the propriety of the investment will depend upon
not merely the facts which he ascertains but the opinion
which he forms. In reaching his conclusion he may take into
consideration advice given to him by attorneys, bankers,
brokers and others whom prudent men in the community re-
gard as qualified to give advice. He is not justified, however,
in relying wholly upon the advice of others, since it is his
duty to exercise his own judgment in the light of the informa-
tion and advice which he receives. In relying upon the
advice of another, he should consider whether the person giv-
ing the advice is disinterested.91
90 233 Mass. 321 at 331, 123 N. E. 665 at 666.
91 Scott on Trusts, Vol. 2, § 227.1, p. 1200.
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Moreover, certain valuable suggestions concerning the mat-
ters which should be considered by a trustee in selecting an in-
vestment are outlined in the Restatement of the Law of Trusts.02
They are: (1) the marketability of the particular investment;
(2) the length of the term of the investment, that is the maturity
date, callability, or redeemability, if any; (3) the probable dura-
tion of the trust; (4) the probable condition of the market with
respect to the value of the particular investment at the termina-
tion of the trust, especially if at the termination of the trust the
investment must be converted into money for distribution; (5) the
probable condition of the market with respect to reinvestment at
the maturity of the particular investment; (6) the aggregate
value of the trust and the nature of the other investments, i. e.,
proper diversification; (7) the requirements of the beneficiary or
beneficiaries, particularly with respect to the amount of the in-
come; (8) the other assets of the beneficiaries including earning
capacity; and (9) the effect of the .investment in increasing or
diminishing liability for taxes. The significance of these matters
is obvious for they all relate to the two paramount considerations
confronting a trustee in selecting trust investments, to-wit: the
safety of the fund invested, and the amount and regularity of the
income. The often unintended emphasis .placed on safety in the
application of the legal list rule has already been pointed out, but
it should not be inferred that the new Act minimizes the necessity
of preserving the capital of trust funds. The language of the Act
refutes such a notion, and properly so, for safety is a matter of
concern not only to the remaindermen but to the life tenants as
well. If a trust fund is lost, the remaindermen lose their dis-
tributive shares, but the life tenants also lose their income. There-
fore, a trustee must proceed with caution, and cannot become
over-zealous in a desire to obtain a high income for the life ten-
ants. If a testator wishes to grant to a trustee power to invest
in speculative enterprises, he should clearly so provide in the trust
instrument. It is no answer to this point to urge that- testators
are not generally familiar with the limitations of statutory and
92 Restatement, Trusts, Vol. I, p. 651, § 227.
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judicial regulations on the subject, because it is equally logical to
assume that testators are acquainted with these limitations and
intend that the trustee shall consider "the probable income as well
as the probable safety of their capital."
The investment field is "a broad one and in this day and age is
a constantly changing one. It is difficult, if not impossible, to lay
down any hard and fast rule concerning the nature of the investi-
gation a trustee should make before placing an investment. Rules
applicable to one class of investments would not apply to another
class. They might well vary as to particular investments within
a given class. Rules applicable to a given investment today might,
due to changing conditions, be inapplicable as to the same invest-
ment a year from now. Therein lies the reason for the flexibility
of the Prudent Man Rule. The investigation which should be
made concerning the worth and propriety of an investment is the
investigation which a man of prudence, discretion and intelligence
would make when investing his funds, not with a view to specula-
tion, but with regard to the permanent disposition thereof, con-
sidering the probable income as well as the probable safety of the
capital.
The foregoing principles, it is believed, outline a procedure
undoubtedly followed in substance by most trustees. The new
Act has created no original problems for experienced trustees.
Established procedures have certainly been 'devised by trustees
managing trust estates under the provisions of trust instruments
granting them wide discretion in the scope of investments. They
may now pursue similar policies with respect to all trusts, unless
specifically directed otherwise in the trust instrument. Additional
responsibilities have thus been given, but these burdens are ac-
companied by an opportunity to render more efficient service.
There need be no fear that the Act will result in lessening the
legal responsibilities of trustees, or will exact a lower degree of
diligence and care. On the contrary, it is believed that the effect
of the Act is in the opposite direction, since it removes from trus-
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tees any inclination to rely upon a legal list with its tendency to
stultify judgment and initiative. The duties of the trustee must
be performed by him with no less fidelity than hitherto required.3
He is expressly forbidden to speculate in any form with the assets
of the trust.94  Although he may personally suffer loss from his
management of the trust estate, he may never personally gain.95
The rules concerning undivided loyalty;96 -against dealing indi-
vidually with the trust estate ;97 against intermingling trust assets
with those of the trustee ;98 and other like, familiar rules regard-
ing trust administration are in no way relaxed.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Any conclusion concerning a new, untried legislative act must,
of necessity, be conjectural. This article has attempted to show
the effect and change produced by the new Prudent Man Statute
on the fundamental Illinois law concerning trust investments.
That Act is designed to make possible greater benefit for bene-
ficiaries and, while it imposes added responsibilities on trustees,
it does permit more efficient service. It is flexible enough to allow
for adjustments required by changing economic conditions.
Whether or not it will achieve the over-all objective intended
depends, in large measure, upon the construction promulgated by
the bar and judiciary of this state. While the difficulties with
which trial judges will be confronted in cases arising under the
Act cannot be minimized, there should be no doubt that the courts
9t' The requirement of complete loyalty is implicit in all the Illinois cases and is
a matter of uniform law throughout the United States. See cases cited in notes
95-98 inclusive.
94 Laws 1945, p. 1779, § 1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 148, § 32.
95 Green v. Gawne, 382 Ill. 363, 47 N. E. (2d) 86 (1943); Hand v. Allen, 294
Ill. 35, 128 N. E. 305 (1920) ; White v. Sherman, 168 Ill. 589, 48 N. E. 128 (1897) ;
Ward v. Armstrong, 84 Ill. 151 (1876) ; Mayr v. Hodge & Homer Co., 78 Ill. App.
556 (1898).
96 Galbraith v. Tracy, 153 Ill. 54, 38 N. E. 937 (1894) ; In re Estate of Sanders.
304 II. App. 57, 25 N. E. (2d) 923 (1940). See also cases cited in note 95, ante.
97 Doner v. Phoenix Land Bank, 381 Ill. 106, 45 N. E. (2d) 20 (1942) ; Kinney v.
Lindgren, 373 Ill. 415, 26 N. E. (2d) 471 (1940) ; Hand v. Allen, 294 Ill. 35, 128
N. E. 305 (1920) ; White v. Sherman, 168 Ill. 589, 48 N. E. 128 (1897) ; People v.
Central Rep. Trust Co., 300 Ill. App. 297, 20 N. E. (2d) 999 (1939).
98 Hannah v. The People, 198 Ill. 77, 64 N. E. 776 (1902) ; Sholty v. Sholty, 140
Ill. 81, 29 N. E. 1041 (1892).
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are competent to administer legislation which comes with a record
of over a century of successful application elsewhere. No statute
is any better than the courts which construe it or the agencies
which enforce it. The Prudent Man Statute is no exception, but
it is a progressive step in the right direction. The bar could well
unite with the judiciary to insure a continuation of that progress.
